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Abstract
Counterfactuals in quantum theory are briefly reviewed and it is argued that
they are very different from counterfactuals considered in the general philosophical
literature. The issue of time symmetry of quantum counterfactuals is considered
and a novel time-symmetric definition of quantum counterfactuals is proposed. This
definition is applied for analyzing several controversies related to quantum counter-
factuals.
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There are very many philosophical discussions on the concept of counterfactuals and
especially on the time’s arrow in counterfactuals. There is also a considerable literature
on counterfactual in quantum theory. In order to be a helpful tool in quantum theory
counterfactuals have to be rigorously defined. Unfortunately, the concept of counter-
factuals is vague1 and this leads to several controversies. I, however, believe that since
quantum counterfactuals appear in a much narrow context than in general discussions on
counterfactuals, they can be defined unambiguously. I will briefly review counterfactuals
in quantum theory and will propose a rigorous definition which can clarify several issues,
in particular, those related to the time-symmetry of quantum counterfactuals.
A general form of a counterfactual is
(i) If it were that A, then it would be that B.
The basic approach to analyzing counterfactuals is to consider the actual world, the world
that we know, in which A is in general not true, and a counterfactual world, closest to
the actual world, in which A is true. The truth of the counterfactual (i) depends on the
truth of B in this counterfactual world.
There is a general philosophical trend to consider counterfactuals to be asymmetric
in time. Even Bennett who was challenging this claim in 1984 reversed his position (as I
learned from private correspondence). In the most influential paper on this subject, Lewis
writes:
I believe that indeterminism is neither necessary nor sufficient for the asym-
metries I am discussing. Therefore I shall ignore the possibility of indetermin-
ism in the rest of this paper, and see how the asymmetries might arise even
under strict determinism. (1986, 37)
In contrast to this opinion, I believe that the indeterminism is crucial for allowing non-
trivial time-symmetric counterfactuals, and that Lewis’s and other general philosophical
analyses are irrelevant for the issue of counterfactuals in quantum theory. The key ques-
tions in these analyses are related to A: How come A if in the actual world A is not
true? Do we need a “miracle” (i.e. breaking the laws of physics) for A? Does A come
by itself, or it is accompanied by other changes? In contrast, in the context of quantum
theory there are no important questions related to A. In some cases A is related to an
external entity which might vary freely by fiat, in other cases the indeterminism of the
theory allows different A without need for “miracles” – the main topic of discussion on
counterfactuals in general philosophy.
The main source of vagueness in counterfactuals is in the definition of a counterfactual
world closest to the actual world. Clearly, it differs in A. In a deterministic world other
differences are also required: a “miracle” for A to happen, etc. There is no rigorous
specification of aspects of a counterfactual world which are fixed to be identical to those
of the actual world. The definition of such specification is missing in most discussions
on quantum counterfactuals too. The main result of this work is a proposal for such
definition. The most important feature of this definition is that it is also applicable for
time-symmetric situations.
1“Counterfactuals are infected with vagueness, as everybody agrees.”(Lewis, 1986, 34)
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In the literature on quantum theory there are two main (different) concepts named
“counterfactuals”. Quantum counterfactuals of the first type are events which did not
happen in our world, but somehow influenced it. To present this concept let me quote
Penrose:
What is particularly curious about quantum theory is that there can be actual
physical effects arising from what philosophers refer to as counterfactuals –
that is, things that might have happened, although they did not happened.
(1994, 240)
In particular, Penrose’s quotation relates to interaction-free measurements (Elitzur and
Vaidman, 1993) in which a location of a supersensitive mine, which explodes if anything
“touches” it, can be found without an explosion. The counterfactual here is the explo-
sion which could have happen, but didn’t. What allows such counterfactuals without
miracles is the indeterminism of the quantum theory (with collapse). In the non-collapse
deterministic interpretation such as the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum theory
(Everett 1957) the explanation is different (and in my opinion is particularly clear). The
counterfactuals are “actual” in other worlds (Deutsch 1997, 275). Thus, in the situa-
tions considered by Penrose, “things” did happened in the physical universe (the union
of all worlds) and thus their effect on some other facts in the physical universe is not so
surprising (see Vaidman 1994).
The counterfactuals of the first type are certainly helpful: they provide deeper expla-
nation of many peculiar quantum phenomena. For example, we can understand why there
is an “interaction-free” measurement which can ascertain that in a certain location there
is a supersensitive mine, but there is no “interaction-free” measurement ascertaining that
in a certain location there is no supersensitive mine: in the latter there is no counterfac-
tual world (such as the world with the explosion in the previous case) different from the
actual one. However, quantum counterfactuals of the first type cannot be brought to the
general form (i) and they will not be the main topic of this paper.
Quantum counterfactuals of the second type are statements in the form (i) related to
a close quantum system. A defines which experiments are performed on this system by
an external observer and B is related to the results of these experiments. The decision of
the observer which experiments to perform is assumed to be independent on the state of
the quantum system under investigation. One can freely change everything outside the
quantum system in question. This aspect represents a crucial difference between quantum
counterfactuals and the counterfactuals in the general philosophical literature where A is
related to the whole world.
Most examples of quantum counterfactuals discussed in the literature are in the context
of EPR-Bell type experiments, see Skyrms (1982), Peres (1993), Mermin (1989) (which,
however, does not use the word counterfactual), Bedford and Stapp (1995) who even
present an analysis of a Bell-type argument in the formal language of the Lewis (1973)
theory of counterfactuals, and Stapp (1997a) which followed by intensive polemic: Unruh
(1997), Mermin (1997a,b), Finkelstein (1998), Mashkevich (1998), and Stapp (1997b,c,d;
1998). A typical example is a consideration of an array of incompatible measurements on a
composite system in an entangled state. Various conclusions are derived from statements
about the results of these measurements. Since these measurements are incompatible
3
they cannot be all performed together, so it must be that at least some of them were not
actually performed. This is why they are called counterfactual statements.
Quantum counterfactuals are usually explicitly asymmetric in time. The asymmetry
is neither in A nor in B; both are about the present time. The asymmetry is in the
description of the actual world. The past but not the future of a system is given.
My purpose here is to avoid the asymmetry in time and to allow both the past and
the future of counterfactual worlds to be fixed. However, it seems that A changes the
future and therefore the future cannot be kept fixed. Indeed, the complete description of a
quantum system is given by its quantum state and the choice of measurements, described
by A, changes the future quantum state to be one of the eigenstate of the measured
variable. Therefore, we cannot hold fixed the quantum state of the system in the future.
The way to overcome this difficulty is not to use a quantum state as the description of a
physical system. For solving the current problem we can consider the quantum state only
as a mathematical tool for calculating the probabilities of the results of measurements,
and not as a description of the “reality” of a quantum system. Indeed, counterfactual
statements are related to our experience which is connected to a quantum system through
results of experiments. Therefore, we can define counterfactuals in terms of results of
experiments without entering the issue the “reality” of a quantum system. The advantage
of this pragmatic approach is that it is universal: it fits all interpretations of quantum
theory. Thus, my proposal for defining counterfactuals in quantum theory is as follows:
(ii) If it were that measurement M′ instead of measurement M has been
performed on a system S, then it would be that the outcome of M′ has property
P. The results of all other measurements performed on the system S are fixed.
M and M′ consist, in general, of measurements of several observables performed at
space-time points Pi. The property P is a certain relation between the results of these
measurements or a probability for such relation to happen.
What makes my definition different and rigorous is the clarification of what is fixed.
Usually, this is not spelled out and it is tacitly assumed that the quantum state of the
system prior to the times of the space-time points Pi is fixed.
In usual time-asymmetric situations, in which the past relative to Pi exists but the
future does not, the counterfactuals according to my definition are identical to those in the
usual approach. Indeed, the results of all measurements in the past define the quantum
state uniquely. No controversies appear in such cases: the past of the counterfactual
worlds is fixed to be the past of the actual world. The problems arise when there is
some information about the future of a system, sometimes, “future” only according to a
particular Lorentz frame. (For systems consisting of spatially separated parts the “past”
and “future” depends on the choice of the Lorentz frame.) Following the principle that
only the past is fixed and bringing together “true” counterfactuals from various Lorentz
frames frequently leads to paradoxes, see Hardy (1992a), Clifton et al. (1992), Stapp
(1997a). In contrast, my definition (ii) is unambiguous in such situations. It yields well
defined statements when we are given results of measurements both in the past and in
the future of Pi, and in the cases when the space-time points Pi are such that future and
past cannot be unambiguously defined.
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For a simple time-symmetric case in which M′ describes a single measurement of a
variable A performed between two complete measurements which fix the states |Ψ1〉 at t1
and |Ψ2〉 at t2, the definition (ii) becomes
(iii) If it were that a measurement of an observable A has been performed
at time t, t1 < t < t2, then the probability for A = ai would be equal to pi,
provided that the results of measurements performed on the system at times t1
and t2 are fixed.
The probabilities pi are given by the ABL formula (Aharonov et al. 1964; Aharonov and
Vaidman 1991):
Prob(ai) ≡ pi = |〈Ψ2|PA=ai|Ψ1〉|
2
∑
j |〈Ψ2|PA=aj |Ψ1〉|2
. (1)
The application of the time-symmetric formula (1) to counterfactual situations led to a
considerable controversy, see Albert et al. (1985), Bub and Brown (1986), Sharp and
Shanks (1993), Cohen (1995), Miller (1996), Vaidman (1998). I believe, that the time-
symmetric definition (iii) provides a consistent way for application of the ABL rule for
counterfactual situations, thus resolving the controversy, see more details in Vaidman
(1996).
The definition (iii) is also helpful in analyzing various attempts to prove that realistic
quantum theory leads to a contradiction with relativistic causality. The “element of
reality” can be considered as an example of a counterfactual (iii) in the particular case of
probability 1 for a certain outcome. A time-symmetrized definition of element of reality
is (Vaidman 1993a):
(iv) If we can infer with certainty that the result of a measurement at time
t of an observable A is a, then, at time t, there exists an element of reality
A = a.
The word “infer” is neutral relative to past and future. The inference about results at
time t is based on the results of measurements on the system performed both before and
after time t.
An important feature of time-symmetric elements of reality (iv) of a pre- and post-
selected quantum system is that the “product rule” does not hold. The product rule
means that if A = a and B = b are elements of reality, then AB = ab is also an element
of reality.
A simple example of this kind is a system of two spin-1
2
particles prepared at t1 in a
singlet state
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉1|↓〉2 − |↓〉1|↑〉2). (2)
At t2 the particles are found in the state
|Ψ2〉 = |↑x〉1|↑y〉2. (3)
A set of elements of reality for these particles at an intermediate time t is (use the ABL
formula (1) to see this):
{σ1y} = −1, (4)
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{σ2x} = −1, (5)
{σ1yσ2x} = −1. (6)
where the notation {X} signifies the outcome of a measurement ofX . Indeed, the product
rule does not hold: {σ1yσ2x} 6= {σ1y}{σ2x}. Note that a measurement of the nonlocal
variable in Eq. (6), the product of local variables related to separated locations, is not
disallowed due to locality of physical interactions. This particular measurement can be
performed using local interactions only (Aharonov et al. 1986).
The failure of the product rule plays an important role in discussing Lorentz invariance
of a realistic quantum theory, especially, in the light of recent proposals to prove the
impossibility of a realistic Lorentz invariant quantum theory which applied the product
rule (Hardy 1992a; Clifton et al. 1992). See more discussion of this controversy in
Vaidman (1993b, 1997), Cohen and Hiley (1995, 1996).
It seems to me that the proposed definition for counterfactuals should also help to
resolve the recent controversy (Stapp 1997a,b,c,d, 1998; Unruh 1997; Mermin 1997a,b;
Finkelstein 1998; Mashkevich 1998) generated by the proposal of Stapp to prove nonlo-
cality of quantum theory using counterfactual analysis of Hardy-type experiment (Hardy
1992b). My definition resolves the vagueness in these discussions, pointed out by Finkel-
stein (1998), about what is fixed in the counterfactual worlds.
I claim that quantum theory does not support the second locality condition of Stapp
(his LOC2). Stapp considers two spatially separated spin-1
2
particles. In his example, a
certain counterfactual statement related to a particle on the right can be proved given
that certain action was performed before that on a spatially separated particle on the
left. He then notes that in another Lorentz frame the action on the particle on the left is
performed after the time to which the counterfactual statement is related. Stapp concludes
that since an action in the future cannot influence the past, the action on the left side
can be replaced by some other action without changing the truth of the counterfactual
related to the particle on the right.
The argument which led Stapp to his locality condition LOC2 does not go through if
we adopt the definition of counterfactuals (ii), considering measurements on the particle
on the right while keeping fixed the results of all other measurements on our system (the
system consisting ot the two spin-1
2
particles). Then, the truth of the counterfactual
requires only the existence of a Lorentz frame in which the measurements on the right
side are after the measurement on the left, and the consideration of the other Lorentz
frames is irrelevant.
In Stapp’s example we indeed have a situation in which an action in a space-like
separated region on the left side changes the truth of a certain counterfactual statement
about measurement on the right. However, I do not see that the failure of LOC2 proves
the “nonlocal character of quantum theory” as the title and the spirit of Stapp’s paper
suggest. In order to demonstrate the meaning of LOC2 let me present another example
where it fails.
Consider again two spatially separated spin-1
2
particles prepared in a singlet state (2).
At time t a Stern-Gerlach experiment with the gradient of a magnetic field in the positive
zˆ direction is performed and the result σ2z = α is obtained. Now consider the following
counterfactual statement:
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CF: If it were that the measurement has been performed with the gradient
pointing in the negative zˆ direction instead, then the same result σ2z = α would
be obtained.
The truth of this statement depends on actions on particle 1 in a space-like separated re-
gion. Indeed, if the measurement of σ1z was performed, the CF is true, if no measurement
is performed or, say σ1x were measured, then the truth of CF does not follow. (Note, that
according to the Bohm-Bell hidden variable interpretation (Bohm 1952, Bell 1987), CF
must be false in this case.)
Of course, since CF cannot be tested, no contradiction with relativistic causality can
arise. Still, there is some nonlocality in this example. For me, the framework of the MWI
yields the clearest picture of this nonlocality. By performing measurements on particle
1 we split our world into two worlds creating a mixture of two worlds for particle 2. By
different choices of measurement on particle 1 we create different mixtures of worlds for
particle 2. For example, the two worlds with definite σ2z (for which CF is true) or the
two worlds with definite σ2x (for which CF does not follow). Although the worlds are
different, the two mixtures are physically equivalent for particle 2 and therefore there
was no nonlocal action in the physical universe which incorporates all the worlds. The
nonlocality is as follows: the world (branch) in the MWI is a nonlocal entity which, in
our case, is defined by properties in the location of the two particles. The choice of a
local measurement on particle 1 defines the set of worlds into which the present world will
be split. In this way an action on particle 1 leads to various sets of possible properties
related to particle 2.
I have to mention a property of definition (ii) which might be considered as its weak-
ness. The outcome of measurement M performed in the actual world plays no role in
calculating the truth of the counterfactual statement (except trivial cases in which P
involves a comparison between the outcome of M and M′ as in the previous example).
It is assumed that properties of the outcome of M′ are independent on the outcome of
M. This is what standard quantum theory tells us, but this is not true, in general, for
hidden variable theories: The outcome of M can yield certain information about hidden
variables, the information which might help to ascertain the properties of the outcome of
M′. However, in the framework of the hidden variables theories, the definition (ii) seems
to be incomplete anyway. In order to avoid vagueness we must add a statement about
hidden variables, for example, by fixing hidden variables in a counterfactual world to be
equal to the hidden variables in the actual world. Given this correction, the outcome of
M adds no information again. However, I do not want to adopt this approach because
it explicitly time-asymmetric: the hidden variables are fixed only in the past. I do not
know how to approach the problem of time-symmetric hidden variables.
The proposed definitions of counterfactuals (ii) and (iii) are also applicable for coun-
terfactuals in classical physics. However, due to the determinism of classical theory we
cannot fix independently the results of a complete set of measurements in the past and
the results of the complete set of measurements in the future. Note that there are certain
limitations of this kind in the quantum case too. For example, consider a spin-1
2
particle
with three consecutive measurements σz(t1) = 1, σx(t) = 1 and σz(t2) = −1, t1 < t < t2.
Then a counterfactual statement “If at time t a measurement of σz were performed in-
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stead, the result would be σz(t) = 1” is neither true, nor false, but meaningless because
the results of measurements σz(t1) = 1, and σz(t2) = −1 are impossible when σz, instead
of σx, is measured at time t. Nevertheless, such constrains are not strong and they leave
a room for numerous nontrivial counterfactuals.
In classical physics the counterfactuals (ii) have even more serious problem. M′ con-
sist of measurements of some observables. We can make a one to one correspondence
between “the outcome of a measurement of an observable O is oi” and “the value of O is
oi”. The latter is independent of whether the measurement of O has been performed or
not and, therefore, statements which are formally counterfactual about results of possi-
ble measurements can be replaced by “factual” (unconditional) statements about values
of corresponding observables. In contrast, in standard quantum theory, observables, in
general, do not have definite values and therefore we cannot always reduce the above
counterfactual statements to “factual” statements.
I do not expect that everybody will agree with my proposals for resolving the con-
troversies discussed above. I hope only that the main result of this work will not be
controversial: a consistent definition of counterfactuals in quantum theory, a definition
that is equivalent to the standard approach for the time-asymmetric cases in which only
the past of the system is given, but which is applicable to the time-symmetric situa-
tion (such as pre- and post-selected systems) – a definition which is a useful tool for the
analysis of many current problems.
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